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members of the bar. This would have the ironic result of impeding
the very objective the disciplinary rules seek to achieve.
Daniela V. Zenone

PENAL LAW

Penal Law section 245.00: New York Court of Appeals holds that
sexual activity in a parked vehicle is not a per se violation of the
public lewdness statute
The New York statute prohibiting public lewdness 1 has historically been broadly construed.2 In determining whether a particular
I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.00 (McKinney 1989). The statute provides that "[a] person is
guilty of public lewdness when he intentionally exposes the private or intimate parts of his
body in a lewd manner or commits any other lewd act (a) in a public place, or (b) in private
premises under circumstances in which he may readily be observed from either a public
place or from other private premises, and with intent that he be so observed." Id.
Section 245.00 was part of an overall revision of the Penal Law based on recommendations by the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code,
which reorganized specific offenses and grouped like offenses together. The section replaced
§ 1140, which provided that "a person is guilty of public lewdness when, in a public place,
he intentionally exposes the private or intimate parts of his body in a lewd manner or commits any other lewd act." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1140 (McKinney 1967). "[T]he statute was
amended. . . to make it clear that lewd conduct in a public place where it is reasonable to
assume the actor intends to be observed by the general public" as well as "lewd conduct in a
private place when the actor can and intends to be observed from a public place or other
private premises constituted the crime of public lewdness." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.00 commentary at 296 (McKinney 1989).
Section 245.00 has been challenged numerous times as being unconstitutionally vague,
however, these challenges have been rejected. See People v. Darryl M., 123 Misc. 2d 723,
726-27, 475 N.Y.S.2d 704, 709 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (gravamen of § 245.00 is
"lewd public behavior" and not simply exposure of private or intimate parts of body); People v. Sullivan, 87 Misc. 2d 254, 254, 383 N.Y.S.2d 791, 792 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 9th Dep't and
10th Dep't 1976) (section 245.00 not void for vagueness). See generally Note, The Proposed
Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. RSv. 1469, 1539 (1964) (discussing sex offenses in
Penal Law).
2 See People v. Gilbert, 72 Misc. 2d 75, 76, 338 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Kings County 1972). To constitute a violation of the public lewdness statute, the defendant
must have committed the allegedly lewd acts in a "public place." See id. In determining
whether such conduct took place in public, New York courts have defined the term quite
liberally. One of the earliest cases involving public lewdness was People v. Bixby, 4 Hun 636
(1875). In Bixby, the court held that a room in a house of prostitution where women exposed themselves in the presence of men was a "public place," despite the fact that the
doors, windows, and shutters of the house were closed. Id. The defendants were found guilty
of indecent exposure "in a public place." Id. Although later cases stated that the statute
should be narrowly and strictly construed, these cases held that § 1140 prohibited exposure
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incident is sufficiently "public" in character, early cases held that
the circumstances surrounding the conduct at issue were more significant than the place of its occurrence. 3 However, this dependence on surrounding circumstances often resulted in conflicting
conclusions regarding what constituted a "public place."' Recently,
in People v. McNamara,5 the New York Court of Appeals held
that the interior of a parked vehicle was not a "public place" unnot only in public places, but in "quasi-public" places as well. See Excelsior Pictures Corp.
v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 3 N.Y.2d 237, 245, 144 N.E.2d 31, 36, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42, 48
(1957).
3 Many of the early cases addressing the "publicness" issue dealt with the charge of
disorderly conduct. See People v. Chesnick, 302 N.Y. 58, 61, 96 N.E.2d 87, 89 (1950) (test is
not whether activity complained of was indoors or outdoors, but whether it had traditional
elements of actual or likely breach of peace); People v. Perry, 265 N.Y. 362, 365, 193 N.E.
175, 177 (1934) (fighting in closed restaurant at 4:00 a.m. did not warrant conviction for
disorderly conduct); People v. Hipple, 263 N.Y. 242, 244, 188 N.E. 725, 725 (1934) (defendant, standing inside doorway of building while congregating with persons standing on public
street, guilty of disorderly conduct); see also infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing disorderly conduct).
The Penal Law employs the term "public place" in defining several offenses. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.20(3), (6) (McKinney 1989) (disorderly conduct); id. § 240.25(2), (3) (harassment); id. § 240.35(1)-(4) (loitering). For example, article 240, entitled "Offenses Against
Public Order," defines "public place" as
a place to which the public or a substantial group of persons has access, and includes, but is not limited to, highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of
amusement, parks, playgrounds, and hallways, lobbies and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual
residence.
Id. § 240.00(1).
Compare People v. Conrad, 70 Misc. 2d 408, 410, 334 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183-84 (Buffalo
City Ct. 1972) (adult entertainment club not a public place) with Bixby, 4 Hun at 636 (room
in prostitution house was a public place) (discussed supra note 2). Conrad involved a "topless" dancer employed in an adult entertainment club to perform sexually-suggestive
dances. Id. at 408, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 182. The interior of the premises was not readily visible
from the street, and the club's patrons were consenting adults who were there by their own
volition. Id. at 408-09, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 182. The dancer was charged with violating the public lewdness statute, but the court ruled that the statute did not apply to a performance
restricted to persons above a certain age, who knew the nature of the performance, were
willing to pay for the privilege to observe, and were gathered in a place where the performance could not be seen by nonconsenting nor unsuspecting members of the general public.
Id. at 410, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
The ambiguity of "public place" within article 245 ("Offenses Against Public Sensibilities") N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 245.00(1) (McKinney 1989) is also evidenced in cases brought
under article 240 ("Offenses Against Public Order"), id. §§ 240.00(1) even though article 240
contains its own definition of "public place," see People v. Richardson, 104 N.Y.S.2d 336,
338 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. Kings County 1951) (hallway of multiple dwelling may be public
place). But see People v. Taylor, 92 Misc. 2d 29, 31, 399 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Queens County 1977) (stoop and inner hallway of two-family house are not public places).
- 78 N.Y.2d 626, 585 N.E.2d 788, 578 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1991).
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less objective circumstances established that acts committed
therein could and likely would be seen by the casual passerby.'
In McNamara, the respondents were separately charged 7 with
having violated section 245.00(a) of the New York Penal Law for
committing sexual acts in cars parked on various streets in the
City of Buffalo, including a "well lit area," a "well lit residential
area," and a "public residential street."8 The Buffalo City Court
I

Id. at 633-34, 585 N.E.2d at 793, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 481 (1991). Although the court in

McNamara did not address the constitutional right of privacy, the court did engage in a
detailed analysis regarding whether the conduct had been performed in a public place. See
id. It is worth noting that section 245.00 is not entitled "Lewdness," but rather "Public
Lewdness." Consequently, courts have historically limited the applicability of the section to
sexual acts performed in "public," recognizing, although not specifically addressing, the participant's right of privacy. This Survey does not address the issue of an individual's constitutionally protected right of privacy; however, for further discussion, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, Justice Douglas "skipped through the Bill of
Rights like a cheerleader-'Give me a P ... give me an R ... an I . . .,' and so on, and
found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or penumbral right." Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The "New"
Substantive Due Process and the DemocraticEthic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
43, 84 (1976) (footnote omitted). See generally Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425 (1974) (interpreting Supreme Court privacy); Paul G. Kauper,
Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The
Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 250 (1965) ("the right of privacy has been much discussed in the Supreme Court decisions .... but substantively nothing much came of that
discussion until Griswold"); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197 (1890) ("It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law
affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the
individual .. ").
7 McNamara, 78 N.Y.2d at 627, 585 N.E.2d at 789, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 477. Separate informations were filed against each of the four respondents. The four cases were later consolidated for purposes of the People's appeal. Id. at 629, 585 N.E.2d at 790, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
478.
8 Id. at 627-28, 585 N.E.2d at 789, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78. The Court of Appeals described the charges against the respondents as follows:
The information against respondent Cheryl McNamara charged that on September 27, 1989, at or about 1:50 A.M., "while at 291 15th Street, a public place
. . .in the rear seat of a 1989 Ford" she exposed private parts of her body while
engaged in sexual intercourse with another person, and that the "vehicle in which
the defendant was seated, was parked in a well lit area, and its interior was readily
visible to passer-byers [sic]."
Separate informations filed against respondents Rose Marie Terrell and Martyn D. Hill charged that on December 5, 1989, "while at 34 Colorado, a public
place ... seated in a 1988 Ford Bronco II" respondent Terrell committed a sexual
act upon respondent Hill, and that those "actions were being committed on a public residential street." The information against respondent Alma Harrison charged
that on December 5, 1989, at or about 12:45 A.M., "while at 70 Colorado, a public
place ... in the passenger seat of a GMC Jimmy truck" respondent committed a
sexual act upon another person while "parked in a well lit residential area."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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dismissed the complaints against the respondents, and these decisions were affirmed by the Erie County Court.' The county court's
decision was "apparently [based] on the ground that the informations failed to allege facts supporting the conclusion that the acts
complained of occurred in public places." 10
Affirming the judgment of the county court, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the interior of a parked vehicle may be
deemed a "public place" if the interior is visible to a casual observer and the vehicle is situated in a place where such a person
would likely encounter it." Writing for the court, Judge Kaye reasoned that the term "public place," as used in the statute, "has no
single readily ascertainable 'plain meaning,'"12 and therefore must
be defined in accordance with legislative intent.13 Because section
245.00 was clearly aimed at protecting public sensibilities, 4 the
court concluded that the statute is not violated unless objective
I

Id. at 628-29, 585 N.E.2d at 790, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 478. The court stated:
The McNamara information was deemed insufficient because it alleged "no facts
which would show that the defendant intentionally exposed the private or intimate parts of her body in a lewd manner, with intent that she be so observed."...
The court dismissed the Harrison information because the allegation that the acts
occurred in a vehicle parked in a well-lit residential area did not establish a "public place" under Penal Law § 240.00. The Terrell and Hill informations were
found insufficient on the grounds that the area of occurrence was not a "public
place," and the prosecution was an attempt to criminalize consensual sodomy.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
1oId. at 629, 585 N.E.2d at 790, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
13Id. at 633-34, 585 N.E.2d at 793, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 481. By establishing objective criteria for applying the statute's language and purpose, the court avoided defining "public
place" as "you know it when you see it," id. at 633-34 n. 4, 585 N.E.2d at 793 n.4, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 481 n.4, referring to Justice Stewart's famous aphorism concerning obscenity,
see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
12 McNamara, 78 N.Y.2d at 629, 585 N.E.2d at 790, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
11Id. at 633, 585 N.E.2d at 792, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 480. Before turning to legislative history, the court considered the language of the statute, for "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); accord Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 350 (1941) ("While one may not end with the words of a disputed
statute, one certainly begins there.").
11 McNamara, 78 N.Y.2d at 631, 585 N.E.2d at 791, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 479. The court
stated that "it is obvious that article 245 was aimed at protecting the public." Id.; see also
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.00 commentary at 296 (McKinney 1989) ("The statute plainly seeks
to prohibit lewd conduct that can impact on the sensibilities of the general public."). In
essence, the Legislature intended to proscribe indecent or lewd exposure or acts directed
towards "unsuspecting, unwilling, nonconsenting, innocent, surprised or likely-to-be offended or corrupted types of viewers." People v. Conrad, 70 Misc. 2d 408, 410, 334 N.Y.S.2d
180, 183 (Buffalo City Ct. 1972) (discussed supra note 4); see also infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing court's focus on statute's purpose).
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facts indicate that the acts committed in the vehicle "can, and
likely would, be seen by the casual passerby."' 15
In a spirited dissent, Judge Bellacosa argued that the majority
erred in failing to apply what he perceived as the plain meaning of
the term "public place."'" Contending that a residential street is
clearly "public," Judge Bellacosa concluded that the majority had,
without authority, inserted "a judicial gloss which, in effect,
add[ed] a culpable mental state or new element into the penal
statute."' 7
It is submitted that the majority ruled correctly in determining that "public place," as used in section 245.00(a) of the Penal
Law, "has no . . . readily ascertainable 'plain meaning,'

"18

and

" McNamara, 78 N.Y.2d at 633-34, 585 N:E.2d at 793, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
" Id. at 635-36, 585 N.E.2d at 794, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 482 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see
Doctors Council v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 71 N.Y.2d 669, 674-75, 525
N.E.2d 454, 456-57, 529 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734-35 (1988) (where statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, court should construe it so as to give effect to plain meaning of words used);
People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 427-28, 399 N.E.2d 513, 517, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (1979)
(words and phrases contained in statute should be given their ordinary meaning when legislature has given no indication that different meaning was intended), appeal dismissed, 446
U.S. 901 (1980).
" McNamara, 78 N.Y.S. at 637, 585 N.E.2d at 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 483 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). Judge Bellacosa also asserted that the criminal information against the respondents were satisfactory "even under the test which the majority adopt[ed]." Id. at 636, 585
N.E.2d at 794, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 482 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also supra note 8
(describing charges against respondents). Finally, noting that police officers witnessed the
respondents performing sexual acts, Judge Bellacosa concluded that "nothing could be more
public than what actually happened, where it happened, what the police officers observed
and what the prosecutor charged-other than perhaps the actors engaging in their criminal
sexual conduct on the sidewalk itself or in a vehicle with windows, doors or convertible roofs
open." Id. at 637, 585 N.E.2d at 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 483 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
The majority, addressing whether the information sufficiently charged the respondents
with lewdness in a "pubic place," rejected the dissent's "contention that allegations of sexual activity in parked cars at stated addresses alone satisfy the statute." Id. at 633, 585
N.E.2d at 792, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 480. The court determined that the McNamara information
"failed to establish that the vehicle was situated in a place where it was likely that respondent's lewd acts would be observed by . . . a [casual passerby]" and that the remaining
informations against the other respondents "failed to establish that respondents' acts were
capable of observation, as they did not indicate that the vehicle interiors were visible to
passersby." Id. at 634, 585 N.E.2d at 793, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
"SId. at 629, 585 N.E.2d at 790, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 478. The People contended that the
informations satisfied the statute since the cars in which the respondents engaged in lewd
conduct were parked on a public street, and that no intent that one be observed was required. Id. In contrast, the respondents urged that "public place," as used in § 245.00,
import[ed] such a degree of "publicness" as to require intent that they be observed or reckless disregard that they might be observed. The [c]ity [c]ourt, in
dismissing the McNamara and Hill informations, relied on an even broader understanding of intent, requiring not only an intent to be seen, but [also] a purpose for
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that the definition must therefore be determined in accordance
with well established principles of statutory construction. 9
Responding to inconsistent interpretations of the term "public
place, ' ' 2 0 the Court of Appeals properly turned its attention to the
"public entertainment, in turn to titillate the defendant."
Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals noted three purported interpretations of the term "public
place" and consequently concluded that the term, in the context of this statute, "has no
single readily ascertainable 'plain meaning.'" Id. The court further explained why
intent to be observed, reckless disregard of observation, or intent to arouse or
gratify sexual desires by means of public observation is not required by section
245.00(a). The crime is defined as a lewd exposure or act (a) in a public place, or
(b) in private premises under circumstances in which [the actor] may readily be
observed from either a public place or from other private premises, and with intent that he be so observed.
Id. at 630, 585 N.E.2d at 791, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (alteration in original). Noting that the
"phrase with intent that he be so observed [is positioned] after subsection (b) rather than at
the [beginning] of the section," the court determined "that intent to be observed is required
only in cases involving private premises." Id.
'9 See id. at 630-31, 585 N.E.2d at 791, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 479. Since the phrase "public
place" is not defined in § 245.00, the People urged the court "to adopt the definition found
in the immediately preceding article-article 240 .... However, section 240.00 specifies that
its definitions are 'applicable to this article,' signalling at the outset that they are inapplicable to article 245." Id. at 630, 585 N.E.2d at 791, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
The court also rejected the "People's argument that the definition of 'public place'
should be drawn from Fourth Amendment decisions and held that there is a diminished
expectation of privacy in automobiles," and held that "the existence of [such] a diminished
expectation . . . [plainly] does not transform the interior of an automobile into a 'public
place.'" Id.
20 See supra note 4. These inconsistencies result from the Court of Appeals' conflicting
approaches to statutory interpretation. Often, the court has held that the words of a statute
"are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation," and has
followed the plain meaning. See New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430,
437, 343 N.E.2d 735, 738-39, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (1975). However, the court has also held
that when adherence to plain meaning produces an unreasonable result, one which is
'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,' the court will follow the
purpose behind the statute rather than the literal words. Id. at 437, 343 N.E.2d at 739, 381
N.Y.S.2d at 21 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940)).
Generally, the plain meaning rule operates to exclude extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, in the interpretation of statutes. See Harry Willmer Jones, The Plain Meaning
Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretationof FederalStatutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 2526 (1939). However, the rule has been widely criticized since language is generally imprecise
and uncertain, and it is difficult to attach a fixed or absolute meaning to words. See William
F. Young, Jr., Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 619, 626-27
(1964). The meaning that a writer intends the words to convey may vary significantly from
the meaning that the words actually convey to others. See generally B.F. SKINNER, VERBAL
BEHAVIOR 29-30 (1957) (imprecision of language is due to conditioning process which pre:
cedes learning use of words).
Case law has provided an array of illustrations of the inexactness of language. See, e.g.,
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (citations omitted) ("A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
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Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute. 2 In a previous case,
the court determined that "statutes 'punishing indecent exposure,
though broadly drawn, must be carefully construed to attack the
particular evil at which they are directed.' "22 The "particular evil"
at which section 245.00(a) is directed is the offense created by the
lewd conduct, and thus the statute prohibits such behavior only
and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."); N.L.R.B. v.
Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (Hand, J.). ("[Wiords are not pebbles in
alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of
each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting
in which they are used . . . ."). Judge Hand further warned that in attempting a solution, it
is "one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress
out of the dictionary." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), af'd, 326 U.S. 404
(1945).
2
See McNamara, 78 N.Y.2d at 631-32, 585 N.E.2d at 791-92, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
This method of statutory interpretation, namely, focusing on the statute's purpose, is often
applied when the court believes that the conduct involved should be considered criminal
only if the evil the statute addresses is indeed at issue. See People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d
326, 331, 406 N.E.2d 780, 783, 428 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926-27 (1980) (defendant engaged in protest who failed to move from path of construction crew was not guilty of disorderly conduct
since his actions were in broad daylight on secluded stretch of his own property). In such
cases, the court seeks not to criminalize the conduct immediately upon the defendant's performance of the acts (in essence, the court refuses to follow a "strict liability" approach),
but rather to hold the defendant liable only when the circumstances surrounding the conduct indicate that the problem the statute sought to remedy was actually present. See id.
Consider the court's decisions in cases dealing with the article immediately preceding
the public lewdness statute, article 240, and specifically, the charge of disorderly conduct.
Parts of the definition of disorderly conduct require that the acts occur in a "public place."
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1989). Subdivision three states that a person is
guilty of disorderly conduct when "[i]n a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language,
or makes an obscene gesture." Id. § 240.20(3). In this context, the Court of Appeals has held
that "[i]n deciding whether an act carries public ramifications, courts are constrained to
assess the nature and number of those attracted, taking into account the surrounding circumstances, including, of course, the time and the place of the episode under scrutiny."
Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d at 331, 406 N.E.2d at 783, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27 (citations omitted);
see also People v. Krull, 18 Misc. 2d 1027, 1028, 194 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (Niagara County Ct.
1959) (defendant who used offensive language while engaged in dispute with next-door
neighbor in common driveway did not engage in "public" conduct where only residents of
disputants' homes and one neighbor were aware of disturbance); People v. La Sister, 9 Misc.
2d 518, 518-19, 170 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703-04 (N.Y.C. Spec. Sess. N.Y. County 1958) (vulgar and
offensive language directed solely towards police officer and not used in presence of any
other person and that did not "annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or [become] offensive to others" insufficient to constitute disorderly conduct) (alteration in original). See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing disorderly conduct).
22 McNamara, 78 N.Y.2d at 631, 585 N.E.2d at 791, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (quoting People v. Price, 33 N.Y.2d 831, 832, 307 N.E.2d 46, 46, 351 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974 (1973)). In Price,
the court held that Penal Law § 245.01 entitled "Exposure of a Person," was "aimed at
discouraging 'topless' waitresses and their promoters, and should not be applied to noncommercial, perhaps accidental, and certainly not lewd, exposure ...." Price, 33 N.Y.2d at 832,
307 N.E.2d at 46, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 974 (citations omitted).
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under circumstances in which it is likely to be observed by "unsus'23
pecting, unwilling,... [or] nonconsenting ..-types of viewers.
Criminalizing sexual conduct in all locations to which the public
has access would conflict with the Legislature's intent by ignoring
the reality that "places that are public in a property sense can'24be
very private in terms of the likelihood of casual observation.
When courts attempt to ascertain the meaning of words and
phrases embodied in a statute, they do more than merely elucidate
the obscurities of statutory language. Instead, a court's interpretation, in essence, extends or limits the scope of the language, thus
strengthening or weakening the statute's operation. 25 The decision
23 McNamara, 78 N.Y.2d at 631, 585 N.E.2d at 791, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80 (quoting
People v. Conrad, 70 Misc. 2d 408, 410, 334 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183 (1972)).
214Id. at 633, 585 N.E.2d at 793, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 481. For example, assume two people
are engaged in sexual activity in a car completely covered with snow on a deserted street at
4:00 A.M. on Christmas Eve. If the plain meaning approach is applied, then these two people have violated section 245.00(a) even though the circumstances clearly indicate that the
"public sensibilities" were not at risk. See id. at 633-34, 585 N.E.2d at 793, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
481. But cf. id. at 637, 585 N.E.2d at 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 483 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)
("[C]onduct itself-public lewdness-is sufficiently offensive.").
Two years prior to McNamara, the Buffalo City Court held that § 245.00 was not in-

tended to "embrace fact situations ...

where the parties were obviously attempting ...

to

be clandestine." People v. Anonymous Female, 143 Misc. 2d 197, 198-99; 539 N.Y.S.2d 868,
870-71 (Buffalo City Ct. 1989) (public lewdness statute should not be "applied or interpreted to apply to any situation where it could be said that, under all the circumstances of
the case, that defendants reasonably should have expected privacy"); see also People v.
Sacks, 2 Misc. 2d 201, 206, 150 N.Y.S.2d 222, 228 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1956)
(innocent acts "do not become crimes, unless there is a tlear and positive expression of the
legislative intent to make them criminal"). The McNamara court's holding, however, indicates that actors who take steps to lessen the likelihood of observation may succeed in immunizing themselves from criminal prosecution under § 245.00(a), since the statutory objective of protecting the public sensibilities is met. See McNamara, 78 N.Y.2d at 633-34, 585
N.E.2d at 793, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
" See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some
Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REy.
385 (1984) (discussing role of modern adjudication). "[Jludges sometimes make law. Both
participants in and observers of the judicial process have recognized this fact for many
years." Id. at 388. Judge Learned Hand wrote:
A judge must think of himself as an artist ...who, although he must know the
handbooks, should never trust to them for his guidance; in the end he must rely
upon his almost instinctive sense of where the line lay between the word and the
purpose which lay behind it; he must somehow manage to be true to both.
Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1939); see also BENJAMIN
N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1925) (judges "fill the open spaces
in the law"). But see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947).
As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function
in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the legisla-
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in McNamara that the interior of a parked vehicle is not per se a
"public place" properly narrows the public lewdness statute's applicability. Had the court ruled that sexual acts are always criminal when performed outside private premises, it would have expanded the statute beyond the Legislature's intent,26 since an
examination of the purpose of section 245.00(a) reveals that, under
certain circumstances, New York has given the green light to sex in
the back seat.
Allen S. Gage

ture. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its
elected legislature.... A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor
to contract it.
Id. See generally Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 293
(1981) (judging is "mixing of linguistic and moral intuitions"); Arthur W. Phelps, Factors
Influencing Judges in InterpretingStatutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 456, 467-68 (1950) (discussing
court's role in statutory construction).
26 See supra notes 14, 20, 21, 24 and accompanying text.

